Most of the extensive literature on corporate governance during the past fifty years has approached the topic from the perspective of agency theory and it has focused on dimensions of governance that are relatively easy to measure (e.g., ownership structure, size and structure of boards,...

This paper examines the bidding behavior of investors who participated in the voucher scheme used to privatize 988 Czech enterprises. In the first round of the privatization scheme, the Czech authorities set a uniform price for all companies, creating a natural experiment for testing several...

We examine the relation between bidder returns and the probability of CEO turnover in acquiring firms. Using a sample of 714 acquisitions during 1990 to 1998, we find that 47% of CEOs of acquiring firms are replaced within five years, including 27% by internal governance, 16% by takeovers, and...

The U.S. defense industry provides a natural experiment for examining how changes in growth opportunities affect the level and structure of corporate debt. Compared with other firms, the growth opportunities of defense firms increased substantially during the Reagan defense buildup of the early...

In 1931, California became the last U.S. state to adopt limited liability for stockholders. Prior to that, from its inception as a state in 1849, stockholders of California corporations faced pro rata unlimited liability. California's unique liability rule during 1849-1931 provides a natural...

In 1931, California became the last U.S. state to adopt limited liability. Prior to that, from its inception as a state in 1849, stockholders of California corporations faced pro rata unlimited liability. California's unique liability rule during 1849-1931 provides a natural experiment for...

We analyze capital structure decisions of U.S. firms during 1905-1924, a period characterized by two shocks that provide a unique experiment for studying the primary determinants of financing choices: (i) the introduction of corporate and individual taxes, and (ii) the onset of World War I,...

CEOs have a potential conflict of interest when their company is acquired: they can bargain to be retained by the acquirer and for private benefits rather than for a higher premium to be paid to the shareholders. We investigate the determinants of target CEO retention by the acquirer and whether...

Using the longest event window, we find that public target shareholders receive a 63% (14%) higher premium when the acquirer is a public firm rather than a private equity firm (private operating firm). The premium difference holds with the usual controls for deal and target characteristics, and...