There are many reasons why managers are interested in maintaining control over their firm. Some potential reasons include compensation, autonomy, power, perquisites, and the ability to determine the terms under which the firm is acquired. This study examines one event that provides an...

Incentives of executives and board of directors play an important role in corporate decisions. Principal agent theory suggests a tradeoff between risk and incentives in optimal compensation contracts for managers. The first essay of this dissertation explores the relationship between the...

We extend the existing literature on the factors explaining the value of acquired firms by examining the effect of corporate governance and other characteristics of Japanese and U.S. acquirers on the long-term post-acquisition stock and accounting performance of their U.S. targets over 1980...

In this study, we use some relatively unique characteristics of the Brazilian stock market to test corporate governance, capital structure, and payout decisions hypotheses. In Chapter One, we find that a composite index (NM6) that proxy for the main governance practices targeted by Bovespas...