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We propose a generic computational framework for solving large-scale infinite-horizon, discrete-time dynamic incentive problems with persistent hidden types. First, we combine set-valued dynamic programming techniques with unsupervised machine learning to determine irregularly-shaped feasible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012850933
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This paper studies monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with persistent supply shocks, that is, sustained increases in production costs due to factors such as wars or geopolitical fragmentation. First, we demonstrate that Taylor rules fail to stabilize long-term inflation due to endogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015101911
We consider discrete‐time dynamic principal–agent problems with continuous choice sets and potentially multiple agents. We prove the existence of a unique solution for the principal's value function only assuming continuity of the functions and compactness of the choice sets. We do this by a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012316341
We consider discrete-time dynamic principal-agent problems with continuous choice sets and potentially multiple agents. We prove the existence of a unique solution for the principal's value function only assuming continuity of the functions and compactness of the choice sets. We do this by a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189721
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599627
We consider discrete‐time dynamic principal–agent problems with continuous choice sets and potentially multiple agents. We prove the existence of a unique solution for the principal's value function only assuming continuity of the functions and compactness of the choice sets. We do this by a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012637313
This paper presents a new method for the analysis of moral hazard principal–agent problems. The new approach avoids the stringent assumptions on the distribution of outcomes made by the classical first‐order approach and instead only requires the agent's expected utility to be a rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011235029