Within the independent private-values paradigm, assuming asymmetric bidders,using the principle of dynamic programming, and employing the notion of Bayes-Nash equilibrium, we demonstrate nonparametric identification of the data-generating process of the sequence of winning prices at multi-unit,...

We use data from a field experiment to estimate worker reaction to incentives and the optimality of piece-rate contracts. Our estimate of the elasticity of output with respect to piece rates is 0.39. Regression methods cannot predict performance under hypothetical contracts. Therefore, we apply...

In this paper, the authors survey some recent empirical work concerning auctions, first outlining two complementary approaches to the empirical analysis of auctions and then discussing several recent developments in the econometric analysis of field data concerning auctions.

We examine the effects of different sequences of work and rest on the daily productivity of workers who planted trees in the province of British Columbia, Canada, comparing the intertemporal productivity profiles of planters who were paid either fixed wages or piece rates. We find that planters...

Within the private-values paradigm, we construct a tractable empirical model of equilibrium behaviour at first-price auctions when bidders' valuations are potentially dependent, but not necessarily affiliated. We develop a test of affiliation and apply our framework to data from low-price,...

We consider the response to incentives as an explanation for productivity differences within a firm that paid its workers piece rates. We provide a framework within which observed productivity differences can be decomposed into two parts: one due to differences in ability and the other due to...