Most research on firm financing studies the choice between debt and equity. We model an alternative source - non-core asset sales - and allow asset sales to occur for operational as well as financing motives. We identify three new factors that drive a firm's choice between selling assets and...

We study firms' incentives to acquire costly information in booms and recessions to understand the role of endogenous information in explaining business cycles. We find that when the economy has been in a recession in the previous period, and firms enter the current period with a pessimistic...

This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes' correlated equilibrium Bergemann and Morris (2016) to multistage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.

A sender designs an information structure to persuade a receiver to take an action. The sender is ignorant about the receiver's prior, and evaluates each information structure using the receiver's prior that is the worst for the sender. I characterize the optimal information structures in this...

We examine the impact of public information on firms’ disclosure strategies. We portray two regimes based on a model that extends the setting of Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988). In the first regime, the firm is able to respond to public information and thus has the last word, and in the...

Global games of regime change -- that is, coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it -- have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We...