The amount of cooperation needed to improve the welfare of signatories of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs), in the presence of market imperfections, depends on the characteristics of pollution. In a dynamic model, the conventional wisdom on the effect of free-riding needs to be...

We try to build a macroeconomic index, that includes some non-market variables, to be compared to the traditional GDP. Over the last twenty years answers to the welfare accounting problem have been different. Economists have used dynamic optimisation to rigorously derive an index that can be...

In this paper, we use the two region CETA-M model to explore some related issues raised by the current interest in CO2 concentration targets as a possible climate change policy objective. First, we identify possible cost and benefit assumptions that would make particular concentration ceilings...

Stabilization of greenhouse gases at sustainable levels is the objective of the FCCC. Strategies to achieve this aim have been the object of intense debate. This paper focuses on one emissions trading system under scrutiny, Joint Implementation (JI). The basic premise of JI is that one nation...

This paper concerns optimal emissions of greenhouse gases when catastrophic consequences are possible. A numerical model is presented which takes into account both continuous climate-feedback damages as well as the possibility of a catastrophic outcome. The uncertainty in the model concerns...

Since the framework convention of Rio, actual environmental negotiations on climate change aim at inducing all world countries to sign global environmental agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Despite the past unsuccessful attempts, even current negotiations seem to pursue the same...

The aim of this paper is to discuss the role played by international institutions in achieving effective International Environmental Agreements. We emphasise the strategic nature of environmental negotiations and use a game theoretic model of coalitional bargaining to illustrate the main issues....

Using an applied general equilibrium model, we explore the impacts of uniform reduction targets, a uniform carbon tax, and permit trading in the Annex 1 countries for the period 2000-2020. Next, we assess the impacts of enlarging the A-1 coalition to the globe, and allow for global permit...

In this paper an n-player non-co-operative game is used to model countries' decision of whether or not to sign an international agreement on climate change control. The stable coalition structure of the game is defined and then computed for a climate game in which the role of carbon leakage is...