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Monitoring incentives and tax planning : evidence from state-owned enterprises

Eberhartinger, Eva; Samuel, David M. P. - In: Journal of accounting and public policy 51 (2025), pp. 1-20

This study examines the association between state owners’ monitoring incentives and the tax planning activities of state-owned enterprises. We distinguish between state owners that directly benefit from state-owned enterprises’ income tax payments and those that do not. In our empirical...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015414001

The three hurdles of tax planning: How business context, aims of tax planning, and tax manager power affect tax

Feller, Anna; Schanz, Deborah - 2014

planning. Second, tax managers can assume very different levels of power in their organization, determining the ability to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420319

The three hurdles of tax planning: How business context, aims of tax planning, and tax manager power affect tax

Feller, Anna; Schanz, Deborah - arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre - 2014

planning. Second, tax managers can assume very different levels of power in their organization, determining the ability to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956315

Right on Schedule : CEO Option Grants and Opportunism

Daines, Robert - 2016

In the wake of the backdating scandal, many firms began awarding options at scheduled times each year. Scheduling option grants eliminates backdating, but creates other agency problems. CEOs that know the dates of upcoming scheduled option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006948

Analyst Following, Staggered Boards, and Managerial Entrenchment

Jiraporn, Pornsit - 2015

We use agency theory to explore how analyst coverage is influenced by the managerial entrenchment associated with the … insulate managers from the discipline of the takeover market. Entrenched managers are well-protected by the staggered board and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036864

The Impact on Auditor Judgments of CEO Influence on Audit Committee Independence and Management Incentives

Cohen, Jeffrey R. - 2012

and managers waive a larger amount of a proposed audit adjustment when management's incentives for earnings management are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116763

Shareholder Influence on Board of Directors and CEO Remuneration : A Literature Review

Rampling, Peter N. - 2014

Purpose – This paper develops a discussion for the shareholder influence on board of directors and CEO remuneration of public listed corporation.Design/methodology/approach – This study entails Australia, The United States of America and The United Kingdom.Findings – The findings show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065860

Curbing Earnings Management : Experimental Evidence on How Clawback Provisions and Board Monitoring Affect Managers’ Use of Discretion

Hales, Jeffrey - 2018

We examine how clawback provisions and board monitoring affect managers' use of discretion to achieve earnings targets … amount of earnings management activity. This null result arises because, while clawbacks do curb the extent to which managers … managers' use of discretion when making operational decisions (real earnings management). In contrast, strong board monitoring …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012923737

Capital structure, Employees' wage and Compensation of the Board of Directors in Iran

Ansari, Majid; Kardan, Behzad; Salehi, Mahdi; Shirzad, Ali - 2021

The main purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between capital structure and Employees' wage costs and compensation of the board of directors in Iran. The paper sample consists of 968 observation and 121 firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2011-2018. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013247032

Family Ownership and CEO Turnovers

Chen, Xia - 2014

This paper investigates the impact of the founding family's presence on CEO turnover decisions. We find that family firms managed by CEOs outside the founding family (i.e., professional CEO family firms) have higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity than family firms managed by family members...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064039