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CEO Equity Incentives and Financial Misreporting : The Role of Auditor Expertise

Jayaraman, Sudarshan - 2014

on misreporting by limiting the ability of managers to carry out such manipulative activities. Using auditor industry …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013052947

Financial Accounting Regulation and Executive Compensation Design

Zhou, Wei - 2011

consistent with the implications of the agency theory. This study extends the literature on the economic consequences of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013123417

Institutional Ownership and CEO Equity Incentives

Bratten, Brian - 2017

This study provides new evidence on the relation between institutional ownership and the equity incentives provided to CEOs by their portfolio holdings of stock and stock options. We show that when firms' CEOs have abnormally high equity incentives, higher institutional ownership is associated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012968161

Performance-Vesting Provisions in Executive Compensation

Bettis, J. Carr - 2018

The usage of performance-vesting (p-v) equity awards to top executives in large U.S. companies has grown from 20 to 70 percent from 1998 to 2012. We measure the effects of p-v provisions on value, delta, and vega of equity-based compensation. We find large differences in the value of p-v awards...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938441

Firm Performance, Shareholder Activism, and Mandatory Executive Compensation Disclosure

Schantl, Stefan - 2020

Early empirical studies find a negative association between firm performance and shareholder activism, whereas more recent studies document a positive association. We argue and theoretically show that this change in behavior results from mandating executive compensation disclosure. We develop a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012839787

The value relevance of accounting performance measures for quoted family firms : a study in the light of the alignment and entrenchment hypotheses

Basly, Sami; Saadi, Tayeb - In: European journal of family business 10 (2020) 2, pp. 6-23

theoretical perspectives have been used to tackle this problem, two main theses based on agency theory were the most frequently …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012434235

Agency Conflicts for Outside Directors During CEO Selection

Nagel, Gregory Leo - 2018

This paper shows outside directors have an increased chance of obtaining new positions (CEO, COB, directorships) during a CEO turnover year in firms that hire a CEO externally. The new positions are determined by outside directors' CEO hiring source choice (internal or external), not their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938304

Mandatory Disclosure Reform, Monitoring, and Executive Compensation

Balsam, Steven - 2016

, reducing managers' informational advantage and opportunities for private benefits leading executives to seek increased explicit … compensation. Alternatively, more disclosure allows shareholders to better observe managers' effort and evaluate their ability … find results consistent with compensation increasing after IFRS adoption implying a net reduction in managers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013008264

Executive compensation tied to ESG performance : international evidence

Cohen, Shira; Kadach, Igor; Ormazabal, Gaizka; … - 2022

This paper examines the reliance on ESG metrics in executive compensation contracts. In our sample of international publicly traded firms, a rapidly growing fraction incorporate ESG metrics in the compensation schemes of their top executives. Our analysis links the reliance on these metrics to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013435292

CEO Power and the Strategic Selection of Accounting Financial Experts to the Audit Committee

Bedford, Anna; Ghannam, Samir; Grosse, Matthew; Ma, Nelson - 2023

We examine the role of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) power in the selection of accounting financial experts (AFEs) to audit committees. Our results show that firms with powerful CEOs have a lower likelihood of appointing AFEs to the audit committee. Furthermore, firms with powerful CEOs are less...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014265169