This paper investigates whether CEO pay disparity reflects efficient contracting or CEO entrenchment by exploiting an exogenous event which mandated option expensing, namely, the introduction of FAS 123R. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find supportive evidence for the entrenchment...

Berle and Means' analysis of the corporation, and in particular their view that those in control are not the owners of the corporation, raises questions about actions that corporations take to counter concerns regarding management's influence. What mechanisms, if any, do corporations implement...

In the aftermath of the Mannesmann case the German corporate law of executive compensation has been increasingly relying on incentive-based payments until the recent financial crisis. By including benchmarks for reasonable compensation in § 87 para. 1 of the Stock Corporation Act (AktG) as...

This paper investigates interactions between two central corporate governance mechanisms: shareholder rights and managerial ownership. I find that the effect of managerial ownership on firm value crucially depends on shareholder rights. Managerial ownership enhances firm value when shareholder...

We investigate experimentally how the enforcement of negative say on pay (SoP) votes affects a CEO's investment incentives, the level and structure of executive compensation, and firm performance. We operationalize the board's discretion in response to a no-vote via three levels of SoP...