This paper advances the idea that, in a variety of environments, it is natural to think of the solution of a (coalition form) game as an ordering of the players rather than as a division of the value of coalitions. Orderings that are characterized by an average of the desirability of one player...

In this paper we introduce games with optimistic aspirations and identify attractive allocation rules for such games through axiomatizations. A game with optimistic aspirations specifies two values for each coalition of players: the first value is the worth that the players in the coalition can...

It is well-known that a transferable utility game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced. In the class of non-transferable utility games balancedness or the more general pi-balancedness due to Billera (1970) is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the core to be non-empty....

A new model of TU game is introduced and studied. Here apart from the characteristic function, two additional functions are used: relations between the players and the probability of coalition formation. We suggest and study the sufficient properties of the probability function to transform it...

A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot...

The core of games arising from semi-infinite transportation situations with infinitely divisible goods is studied. In these situations one aims at maximizing the profit from transporting a good from a finite number of suppliers to an infinite number of demanders. This good is infinitely...

Market entry situations are modelled, where an entrepreneur has to decide for a collection of markets which market to enter and which not. The entrepreneur can improve his prior information by making use of a group of informants, each of them knowing the situation in one or more markets. For...

We study linear production situations with an infinite number of production techniques. Such a situation gives rise to a semi-infinite linear program. Related to this program, we introduce primal and dual games and study relations between these games, the cores of these games and the so-called...

We consider a multi-sided assignment game with the following characteristics: (a) the agents are organized in m sectors that are connected by a graph that induces a weighted m-partite graph on the set of agents, (b) a basic coalition is formed by agents from different connected sectors, and (c)...