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Players that participate in a cooperative game with transferable utilities are assumed to be part of a permission structure being a hierarchical organization in which there are players that need permission from other players before they can cooperate. Thus a permission structure limits the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060800
In this paper we introduce a property of balanced contributions in the context of multi-issue allocation situations.Using this property, we characterise the run-to-the bank rule for multi-issue allocation situations
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014062458
This paper studies situations in which a project consisting of several activities is not executed as planned. It is divided into three parts. The first part analyzes the case where the activities may be delayed; this possibly induces a delay on the project as a whole with additional costs....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014062460
It is not only the rule of a game that determines whether the game is cooperative or not in some instances. The historical strategies of the players in the game have a great effect on it also. Rational players will choose their strategies to make the game to be cooperative or non-cooperative,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014062704
The classical literature (Pigou (1920), Coase (1960), Arrow (1970)) and the relatively recent studies (cf.Varian (1994)) associate the externality problem with efficiency. This paper focuses explicitly on the compensation problem in the context of externalities. To capture the features of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014063849
An assignment situation can be considered as a two-sided market consisting of two disjoint sets of objects. A non-negative reward matrix describes the profit if an object of one group is assigned to an object of the other group. Assuming that each object is owned by a different agent, Shapley...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014063854
In this paper conditions are given guaranteeing that the Core equals the D-core (the set of unDominated imputations). Under these conditions, we prove the non-emptiness of the intersection of the Weber set with the imputation set. This intersection has a special stability property: it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064640
We study the play of mutual interests games by satisficing decision makers. We show that, for a high enough initial aspiration level, and under certain assumptions of "tremble," there is a high probability (close to unity) of convergence to the Pareto dominant cooperative outcome. Simulations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064644
In this paper we consider a proper Shapley value (the V L value) for cooperative network games. This value turns out to … have a nice interpretation. We compute the V L value for various kinds of networks and relate this value to optimal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064942
A new way is presented to define for minimum cost spanning tree (mcst-) games the irreducible core, which is introduced by Bird in 1976. The Bird core correspondence turns out to have interesting monotonicity and additivity properties and each stable cost monotonic allocation rule for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066734