The level of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay responds asymmetrically to good and bad news about the CEO's ability. The average CEO captures approximately half of the surpluses from good news, implying CEOs and shareholders have roughly equal bargaining power. In contrast, the average CEO bears...

We develop a model of the optimal initial public offering (IPO) decision in the presence of learning about the average profitability of a private firm. The entrepreneur trades off diversification benefits of going public against benefits of private control. Going public is optimal when the...

If CEOs have considerable power over their own compensation, then we expect them to avoid pay cuts following bad news about their ability, and win large pay raises following good news. Contrary to this view, I find that CEOs capture only 20-33% of the surplus resulting from good news, and they...

I evaluate the forced CEO turnover rate and quantify effects on shareholder value by estimating a dynamic model. The model features learning about CEO ability and costly turnover. To fit the observed forced turnover rate, the model needs the average board of directors to behave as if replacing...