What are the incentives faced by local officials in China? Without democratic institutions, there is no mechanism for local residents to exercise "voice". Given the hukou registration system, local residents have little opportunity to threaten "exit" if they are unhappy with local taxes and...

Under the influence of major random events such as US-China trade dispute and the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak, the uncertainty of macroeconomic regulation has also risen significantly. Then, what role economic policy level shocks and uncertainty shocks play in industrial regulation need to...

At-scale manufacture of customized products often requires both traditional processes and additive manufacturing that is enabled through 3D printing (3DP). Such 3DP-enabled hybrid manufacturing supports two forms of customization. First, customizing the mix of traditional and 3DP processes...

We examine whether climate-change risk affects firms’ cost of capital when firms can adapt to the risk. We find firms’ cost of long-term loans increases with sea level rise (SLR) risk, but this effect mainly holds among firms with high adjustment costs to the risk, i.e., firms for whom it is...

We show that the many unusual features of China's financial markets are consistent with a government choosing regulations to maximize a standard type of social welfare function. Under certain conditions, these regulations are equivalent to imposing explicit taxes on business and interest income,...

The Great Leap Forward (GLF) disaster, characterized by a collapse of grain output, and the associated famine in China between 1959 and 1961, can be attributed to a systemic failure in central planning. Encouraged by unrealistic expectations for agricultural productivity gains from...

Exploiting a unique data set containing transactions data from a panel of 769 Chinese stateowned enterprises between 1980 and 1989, this paper tests microeconomic implications of a pervasive form of corruption-official diversion of under-priced, in-plan goods to the market. Corruption has the...

A sender may communicate with a decision maker through intermediaries. In this model, an objective sender and intermediary pass on information truthfully, while biased ones favor a particular agenda but also have reputational concerns. I show that the biased sender and the biased intermediary's...