We analyze a model of monopolistic price discrimination where only some consumers are originally sufficiently informed about their preferences, e.g., about their future demand for a utility such as electricity or telecommunication. When more consumers become informed, we show that this benefits...

Using personal data collected on the internet, fi?rms and political campaigners are able to tailor their communication to the preferences and orientations of individual consumers and voters, a practice known as hypertargeting. This paper models hypertargeting as selective disclosure of...

This paper builds on the notion that corporate borrowers care about the overall riskiness of a bank's operations as their continued access to credit may depend on the bank's ability to roll over loans or to expand existing credit facilities. A key implication of this observation is that...

This paper analyses contract cancellation and product return policies in markets in which sellers advise customers about the suitability of their offering. When customers are fully rational, it is optimal for sellers to offer the right to cancel or return on favorable terms. A generous return...

We analyze corporate lending when loan officers must be incentivized to prospect for loans and to transmit the soft information they obtain in that process. We explore how this multi-task agency problem shapes loan officers' compensation, banks' use of soft information in credit approval, and...

A firm advises customers through an agent, such as a mortgage broker, who is incentivized through commissions and the threat of firing. We show that this implies an upper boundary for the feasible "standard of advice", up to which the standard increases with commissions.