A general framework is described specifying how boundedly rational decision makers generate their choices. Starting from a "Master Module"; which keeps an inventory of previously successful and unsuccessful routines several submodules can be called forth which either allow one to adjust behavior...

Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules,...

Ad-hoc contracting allows to quickly react to changes which could be neglected or noticed too late in case of constant contracting. But always deciding anew, e.g., how much and what to order in commercial and what to buy in private life, is too cumbersome. To capture the cognitive burden of...

In an ultimatum bargaining, we investigate lying as falsely stating what one privately knows without, however, excluding that others find out the truth. Specifically, we modify the Acquiring-a-Company game. Privately informed sellers send messages about the alleged value of their company to...