In an experimental 2x2 coordination game with two strict equilibria we observe that, in contrast to equilibrium selection theory (Harsanyi and Selten 1988), only half of the subjects choose the strategy that relates to the payoff- and risk-dominant equilibrium. We propose modified risk dominance...

Divide the decision-maker's future into: (i) a pre-outcome period (lasting from the decision until the outcome of that decision is known), and (ii) a sequel post-outcome period (beginning when the outcome becomes known). Anticipated emotions in both periods may influence the decision, in...

Based on an experimental analysis of a simple monetary economy we argue that a monetary system is more stable than one would expect from individual rationality. We show that positive reciprocity stabilizes the monetary system, provided every participant considers the feedbacks of his choice to...

We suggest a new micro-foundation of money in which markets are well-organized but consumers' preferences are stochastic. In this model, we solve for stationary equilibria and show that there is an optimum quantity of money. The rational solution of our model is compared with actual behavior in...

We consider a repeated stochastic coordination game with imperfect public monitoring. In the game any pattern of coordinated play is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Moreover, standard equilibrium selection arguments either have no bite or they select an equilibrium that is not observed in...

We suggest a simple asset market model in which we analyze competitive and strategic behavior simultaneously. If for competitive behavior two-fund separation holds across periods then it also holds for strategic behavior. In this case the relative prices of the assets do not depend on whether...

A large literature is concerned with analysis and empirical application of theories of decision making for environments with risky outcomes. Expected value theory has been known for centuries to be subject to critique by St. Petersburg paradox arguments. More recently, theories of risk aversion...

This paper contributes to the micro-foundation of money in centralized markets with idiosyncratic uncertainty. It shows existence of stationary monetary equilibria and ensures that there is an optimum quantity of money. The rational solution of our model is compared with actual behavior in a...

For an axiomatic approach to a special solution of the Nash-bargaining problem we use a weakened form of invariance of the solution under affine linear transformations of utility which is motivated by behavioural studies on bounded rationality. Besides standard axioms a new compensation axiom is...