Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 x 2 games used by Selten and Chmura (2008) and in the comment by Brunner, Camerer and Goeree (2009). Every participant played against four neighbors and could choose a different...

This paper experimentally examines the relationship between self-reporting risk preferences and behavioral choices in the subsequently played dictator, ultimatum and investment games. The results from these experiments are used to discern the motivational bases of behavioral choices in the...

This paper experimentally examines the efficiency of information aggregation in a simple asset market. Traders decide how to allocate an endowment of 1000 eurocent between two assets. Only one asset will be successful and that will pay back the amount invested in it. The experiment carried out...

This paper investigates preferences for different health profiles, especially sequences of increasing and decreasing pain. We test conflicting predictions in terms of preferences over two painful sequences. The QALY concept relevant for the determination of different levels of health-related...

In an experimental setting, subjects face a standard elicitation task for certainty equivalents. We show that when a third, objectively irrelevant, option is added to the standard task, the willingness to take risks increases.

The QALY concept is the commonly used approach in research to evaluate the efficiency of therapies in cost utility analysis. We investigate the risk neutrality assumption for time of the QALY concept: can time be included as a linear factor? Various studies show that this assumption does not...

This paper investigates both the no-arbitrage condition and the efficiency of financial markets by comparing two stock markets: the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the German Exchange Electronic Trading System (XETRA). We analyze German stocks that are traded simultaneously at both exchanges...

Expected value theory has been known for centuries to be subject to critique by St. Petersburg paradox arguments. And there is a traditional rebuttal of the critique that denies the empirical relevance of the paradox because of its apparent dependence on existence of credible offers to pay...

We consider a repeated stochastic coordination game with imperfect public monitoring. In the game any pattern of coordinated play is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Moreover, standard equilibrium selection arguments either have no bite or they select an equilibrium that is not observed in...