Recent experimental results show that equilibrium selection in coordination games exhibits remarkable regularities. In the paper we analyze three important determinants for equilibrium selection, the size of the population of players, the number of periods during which players interact, and the...

Two firms, firm A in country A and firm B in country B, compete in hiring two types of workers. Type 1-workers would be less productive when working abroad whereas type 2-workers are equally productive when working abroad or at home. Employers compete by offering employment contracts for both...

On an otherwise symmetric oligopoly market with stochastic demands for heterogeneous products firms can either hire an employee or partner or buy the required labor input on the labor market. Whereas the wage of hired labor does not depend in the realization of stochastic demand, the price of...

Two firms, each consisting of a team with the owner and just one employee, compete on the labor market with free labor mobility. After observing the investment decisions by firm owners their employees can engage in costly training, thus increasing their general and firm-specific productivity,...

Subjects repeatedly played a three-player coordination game with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant equilibrium. Subjects interacting in fixed groups quickly coordinated on the payoff-dominant equilibrium, while those interacting with their neighbours around a circle eventually coordinated on...

We analyze local as well as global interaction and contagion in population games, using the formalism of neural networks. In contrast to much of the literature, a state encodes not only the frequency of play, but also the spatial pattern of play. Stochastic best response dynamics with logistic...

In recent work on non-cooperative network formation star-shaped networks play an important role. In a particular theoretical model of Bala and Goyal (2000) center-sponsored stars are the only strict Nash networks. In testing this theoretical model Falk and Kosfeld (2003) do not find any...

Some recent results on the evolution of conventions are reviewed. Concerning the theoretical part of the paper, we compare the traditional replicator dynamics approach (in the evolution of conventions) with the local interaction approach. Some new results on the coexistence of conventions are...

We consider a finitely repeated coordination game with multiple Nash equilibria which can be Pareto-ranked. We present experimental evidence that the strategies actually selected during the course of the game crucially depend on the information given to the subjects about their opponents'...