Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 x 2 games used by Selten and Chmura (2008) and in the comment by Brunner, Camerer and Goeree (2009). Every participant played against four neighbors and could choose a different...

This paper presents results from an experiment designed to study the effect of self reporting risk preferences on strategy choices made in a subsequently played 2x2 coordination game. The main finding is that the act of answering a questionnaire about one's own risk preferences significantly...

Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 × 2 games used by Selten and Chmura [1]. Every participant played against four neighbors. As a distinct aspect our experimental design allows players to choose different strategies...

This paper presents results from an experiment designed to study the effect of self reporting risk preferences on strategy choices made in a subsequently played 2 X 2 coordination game. The main finding is that the act of answering a questionnaire about one's own risk preferences significantly...

Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 × 2 games used by Selten and Chmura [1]. Every participant played against four neighbors. As a distinct aspect our experimental design allows players to choose different strategies...

In an experimental framework on network formation inspired by the two-way information flow model of Bala and Goyal (2000), we observe that many groups participating in the experiment reach the strict Nash network resp. come very close to this network. Compared to the results of previous network...

Inspired by the theoretical results on network formation by Bala and Goyal (2000) and experimental evidence by Plott and Callander (2002) and Falk and Kosfeld (2003) we design network formation experiments in discrete and continuous time. Particularly in the continuous time experiment, we...

A population of players is considered in which each player may select his neighbors in order to play a 2x2 coordination game with each of them. We analyze how the payoffs in the underlying coordination game effect the resulting equilibrium neighborhood resp. network structure. Depending on the...

A population of players is considered in which each agent can select her neighbors in order to play a symmetric 2x2 game with each of them. The result of the simultaneous neighborhood choice of each agent is a network on the population from. We analyze all types of 2x2 games and show how the...

Each of several exchange partners owns a specific commodity which she can share with others. Unlike in other social dilemma scenarios like prisoners' dilemma, public goods games, etc., voluntary cooperation relies on bilateral exchanges whose profitabilities are interdependent. How will mutual...