We experimentally explore indefinitely repeated contests. Theory predicts more cooperation, in the form of lower expenditures, in indefinitely repeated contests with a longer expected time horizon, and our data support this prediction, although this result attenuates with contest experience....

Game-theoretic models of learning are hard to study even in the laboratory setting due to econometric and practical concerns (like the limited length of an experimental session).In particular, as the simulations by (Salmon, 2001) show, in a cross-model (or "blind'') testing of several models,...

We extend public goods game and design transboundary public goods game which players receive more information from the local group, and marginal return per capital (MPCR) is heterogeneous across local groups that high MPCR among local groups and low MPCR among counter groups. We experimentally...

We experimentally analyze the effect of endogenous group formation on the type of sanctioning institutions emerging in a society. We allocate subjects to one of two groups. Subjects play a repeated public goods game and vote on the sanctioning system (formal or informal) to be implemented in...

A growing body of literature in experimental economics examines how cognitive ability affects cooperation in social dilemma settings. We contribute to the existing literature by studying this relationship in a more complex and strategic environment when the number of partners increases in an...

We study how intelligence and personality affect the outcomes of groups, focusing on repeated interactions that provide the opportunity for profitable cooperation. Our experimental method creates two groups of subjects who have different levels of certain traits, such as higher or lower levels...