We investigate why a firm might purposefully hire a chief executive officer (CEO) who under- or over-estimates the degree of substitutability between competing products. This counterintuitive result arises in imperfect competition because CEO bias can affect rival behavior and the intensity of...

We investigate the welfare effect of union activity in a relatively new oligopoly model, the Cournot-Bertrand model, where one firm competes in output (<i>a la</i> Cournot) and the other firm competes in price (<i>a la</i> Bertrand). The Nash equilibrium prices, outputs, and profits are quite diverse in this...

We investigate the welfare effect of union activity in a relatively new oligopoly model, the Cournot-Bertrand model, where one firm competes in output (a la Cournot) and the other firm competes in price (a la Bertrand). The Nash equilibrium prices, outputs, and profits are quite diverse in this...

Contents: Part I -- Introduction -- 1. Behavioral industrial organization: a synthesis of behavioral economics and industrial organization / Elizabeth Schroeder, Carol Horton Tremblay, and Victor J. Tremblay -- Part II -- Behavioral issues and industrial organization -- 2. Relative thinking and...

We investigate why a firm might purposefully hire a chief executive officer (CEO) who under- or over-estimates the degree of substitutability between competing products. This counterintuitive result arises in imperfect competition because CEO bias can affect rival behavior and the intensity of...