We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1], and Frohlich <em>et al.</em> [2], which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects' production (libertarian principle)....

We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1], and Frohlich et al. [2], which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects' production (libertarian principle)....

We report experimental evidence on gender differences in financial decision that involves three depositors choosing between waiting or withdrawing their money from a common bank. We find that the position in the line, the fact of being observed and the observed decisions are key determinants to...

We report experimental data on expectations about generosity in a dictator game in which dictators first divide the pie and then make a guess about the donation of other dictators. In our experiment, recipients have to guess the donation that they are going to receive from their own dictator as...