Motivated by a characteristic way in which firms in developed countries make their decisions regarding cooperation with potential partners from less developed countries, we design a simple model of a DC firm's search for an LDC partner/supplier and the subsequent relationship between the two...

This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in settings with nondurable trading opportunities and complete but unverifiable information. The framework explicitly accounts for the parties' individual trade actions. The sets of implementable state-contingent...

We consider a continuous-time labor matching model with endogenous separation. Firms initially lack information about the quality of workers with whom they are matched. They acquire information both from pre-employment testing and, in the case in which a labor relationship is established,...

The author studies alternating-offer bargaining games with two-sided incomplete information about the players' discount rates. For both perfect Bayesian equilibrium and a rationalizability-style notion, he characterizes the set of expected payoffs which may arise in the game. The author also...