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Whether consumers are aware of potentially adverse product effects is key to private and social incentives to disclose information about undesirable product characteristics. In a monopoly model with a mix of aware and unaware consumers, a larger share of unaware consumers makes information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011441864
Whether consumers are aware of potentially adverse product effects is key to private and social incentives to disclose information about undesirable product characteristics. In a monopoly model with a mix of aware and unaware consumers, a larger share of unaware consumers makes information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011115728
The paper introduces the problem of unawareness into multi-dimensional Principal–Agent theory. We introduce two key parameters to describe the problem, the extent and the effect of unawareness, show under what conditions it is optimal for the Principal to propose an incomplete or a complete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010865800
The available evidence from numerous studies suggests that overconfidence is a more important phenomenon in North America than in Japan. The pattern is reversed for shame, which appears to play a more important role among Japanese than North Americans. We develop a model that endogenizes these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010944621
The available evidence from numerous studies suggests that overconfidence is a more important phenomenon in North America than in Japan. The pattern is reversed for shame, which appears to play a more important role among Japanese than North Americans. We develop a model that endogenizes these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010934790
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010936371
The paper introduces the problem of unawareness into principal--agent theory and discusses optimal incentive contracts when the agent may be unaware of her action space. Depending on the agent's default behaviour, it can be optimal for the principal to propose an incomplete contract (that keeps...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010575584