During the last three decades the ascent of behavioral economics clearly helped to bring down artificial disciplinary boundaries between psychology and economics. Noting that behavioral economics seems still under the spell of the rational choice tradition - and, indirectly, of behaviorism - we...

Retributive responses do play a role in human behavior. Whether they are primarily triggered by supposed intentions or by observed consequences of actions is an important question. It can be addressed by experimental studies of retributive responses in situations in which the individual actor...

If the (un)trustworthy are rare, people will talk about them, making their detection more reliable and / or less costly. When, however, both types appear in large numbers, detecting (un)trustworthiness will be considerably more difficult and possibly too costly. Based on Güth and Kliemt (2000)...

Zusammenfassung: In diesem Beitrag lassen wir herkömmliche Kritikpunkte an der ökonomischen Neo-Klassik Revue passieren und untersuchen, inwieweit die heutige experimentelle Ökonomik diesen durch gesteigerte Realwissenschaftlichkeit entgeht. Eine induktive Vorgehensweise, bei der im Labor...

In plausible theories of bounded rationality actors are not stimulus-response machines but human beings. As such they are guided by theories that predict the course of the world and prescribe how they should try to intervene in that course. Since boundedly rational human beings cannot only...

Subjective payoffs that represent given preferences "all things considered" together with strictly uncommitted opportunity taking cannot account for the behavior of personal actors. It is shown how agent based approaches can explicitly capture internal commitments of persons while sticking to...

In plausible theories of bounded rationality actors are not stimulus-response machines but human beings. As such they are guided by theories that predict the course of the world and prescribe how they should try to intervene in that course. Since boundedly rational human beings cannot only...

Die Frage, welche Dartsellungsweise strategischer Interaktionen man als grundlegend für die spieltheoretische Analyse und insoweit als normale Form von Spielen anzusehen hat, ist keineswegs rein sprachlicher Natur. Systematische Gründe sprechen dafür, die Agentennormalform anstelle der...

Problems of social coordination can be formalized as non-cooperative games with several equilibria. We know that in such situations serious problems of equilibrium selection arise which cannot be solved by traditional game theoretical reasoning. Conventions seem to be a powerful tool to solve...