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We survey axiomatic results concerning the Shapley value [Shapley, 1953]. This marginalist allocation rule results from an axiomatic study of the class of coalitional games. Several authors have enriched Shapley?s axiomatic study and have provided new characterizations of this allocation rule....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011187140
In this article, we generalize the position value, defined by Meessen (1988) for the class of deterministic communication situations, to the class of generalized probabilistic com- munication situations (G ́ Gomez et al. (2008)). We provide two characterizations of this new allocation rule....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011026229
We provide a generalization of the position value (Meessen 1988) that allows players to benefit from transfers of worth by investing in their communication links. The player who invests the most in a communication link obtains a compensation from the second one. We characterize this new...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008494150
In this article, we generalize the position value, defined by Meessen (1988) for the class of deterministic communication situations, to the class of generalized probabilistic communication situations (G´omez et al. (2008)). We provide two characterizations of this new allocation rule....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584598
We survey axiomatic results concerning the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)). This marginalist allocation rule results from an axiomatic study of the class of coalitional games. Shapley (1953) specifies a list of desirable properties of solutions for this class of games, and he shows that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008595873
The goal of this article is to generalize the position value (Meessen, 1988) in order to take into account the negotiation powers of players on the allocation of the worth. These negotiation powers are formalized via a weight scheme similar to the one defined by Haeringer (2006). We define and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662569
We provide a generalization of the position value (Meessen 1988) that allows players to benefit from transfers of worth by investing in communication links. The player who invests the most in a communication link obtains transfers of worth from the second one. We characterize this new allocation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793571