This paper presents results on stochastic stability in evolutionary game theory. We will see that imitation processes with bounded memory and sampling (Josephson, Matros, 2004) select Pareto outcomes whereas Fictitious Play processes with bounded memory select risk-dominant outcomes in the sense...

A product set of strategies is a p-best response set if for each agent it contains all best responses to any distribution placing at least probability p on his opponents' profiles belonging to the product set. A p-best response set is minimal if it does not properly contain another p-best...

Fudenberg et Kreps (1993), Young (1993), et Sela et Herreiner (1999) ont souligné l'insuffisance du critère de convergence en croyances du processus de Fictitious Play dans un cadre d'apprentissage des équilibres de Nash. En conséquence, nous choisissons d'étudier la convergence en...

Interaction on hypergraphs generalizes interaction on graphs, also known as pairwise local interaction. For games played on a hypergraph which are supermodular potential games, logit-perturbed best-response dynamics are studied. We find that the associated stochastically stable states form a...

We consider the class of (finite) spatial games. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player has a payoff of at least k is NP-complete as a function of the number of players. When each player has two strategies and the base game is an...

We consider the class of (finite) spatial games. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player has a payoff of at least k is NP-complete as a function of the number of players. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004