We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition tructures always exist, and provide sufficient...

We consider hedonic games with separable preferences, and explore the existence of stable coalition structures if only individual deviations are allowed. For two natural subdomains of separable preferences, namely preference domains based on (1) aversion to enemies and (2) appreciation of...

In this paper the equal split-off set is introduced as a new solution concept for cooperative games. This solution is based on egalitarian considerations and it turns out that for superadditive games the equal split-off set is a subset of the equal division core. Moreover, the proposed solution...

Numerous works in the last decade have analyzed the question of how to compare opportunity sets as a way to measure and evaluate individual freedom of choice. This paper defends that, in many contexts, external procedural aspects that are associated to an opportunity set should be taken into...

Recent work by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) considers the problem of group identification from a social choice perspective. These authors provide an axiomatic characterization of a liberal aggregator, whereby the group consists of those and only those individuals each of which views oneself a...

We consider the problem of ranking sets of objects, the members of which are mutually compatible. Assuming that each object is either good or bad, we axiomatically characterize three cardinality-based rules which arise naturally in this dichotomous setting. They are what we call the symmetric...

In this paper we axiomatically characterize two recursive procedures for defining a social group. The first procedure starts with the set of all individuals who define themselves as members of the social group, while the starting point of the second procedure is the set of all individuals who...

In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are...

In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning...