The general framework of decision emergence (Güth, 2000a) is applied to the specific decision task of a proposer in ultimatum bargaining, i.e. to choosing how much the responder should be offered. For this purpose the Master Module as well as its submodules New Problem Solver, Adaptation...

The experimental situation presents a complex stochastic intertemporal allocation problem. First, two initial chance moves select one of three possible termination probabilities which then determines whether life lasts 3,4,5, or 6 periods. Compared to Anderhub et al. (1997) participants are...

On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk neutrality throughout. With the help of these...

The game theoretic prediction for alternating offer bargaining depends crucially on how 'the pie' changes over time, and whether the proposer in a given round has ultimatum power. We study experimentally eight such bargaining games. Each game is once repeated before moving on to the next one...

Predating predators requires at least three specimen to which we refer as players 1, 2, and 3. Player 1 has simply to guess nature when trying to find food. Player 2 is hunting player 1 in the hope that 1 is well-fed but must also avoid being hunted by player 3. One major motivation is to test...

Retributive responses do play a role in human behavior. Whether they are primarily triggered by supposed intentions or by observed consequences of actions is an important question. It can be addressed by experimental studies of retributive responses in situations in which the individual actor...

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric...

In the heterogeneous experimental oligopoly markets of this paper, sellers first choose capacities and then prices. In equilibrium, capacities should correspond to the Cournot prediction. In the experimental data, given capacities, observed price setting behavior is in general consistent with...

A situation in which the regularity in nature can be utilized while competition is to be avoided is modelled by the Parasite game. In this game regular behaviour could enhance guessing nature but strategic randomization is required to avoid being outguessed. In an experiment, 60 pairs of...

We study behavior in experimental beauty contests with, first, boundary and interior equilibria, and, second, homogeneous and heterogenous types of players. We find quicker and better convergence to the game-theoretic equilibrium with interior equilibria and homogeneous players.