By illuminating the philosophical roots of the various notions of knowledge employed by economists, this Handbook helps to disentangle conceptual and typological issues surrounding the debate on knowledge amongst economists. Wide-ranging in scope, it explores fundamental aspects of the...

We study a local interaction model where agents play a finite n-person game following a perturbed best-response process with inertia. We consider the concept of minimal p-best response set to analyze distributions of actions in the long run. We distinguish between two assumptions made by agents...

A product set of strategies is a p-best response set if for each agent it contains all best responses to any distribution placing at least probability p on his opponents' profiles belonging to the product set. A p-best response set is minimal if it does not properly contain another p-best...

Fudenberg et Kreps (1993), Young (1993), et Sela et Herreiner (1999) ont souligné l'insuffisance du critère de convergence en croyances du processus de Fictitious Play dans un cadre d'apprentissage des équilibres de Nash. En conséquence, nous choisissons d'étudier la convergence en...

We study farsighted coalitional stability in the context of TUgames. Chwe (1994, p.318) notes that, in this context, it is difficult to prove nonemptiness of the largest consistent set. We show that every TU-game has a nonempty largest consistent set. Moreover, the proof of this result points...

We study farsighted coalitional stability in the context of TU-games. We show that every TU-game has a nonempty largest consistent set and that each TU-game has a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable set. We characterize the collection of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets. We...