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All countries would agree to immediate global free trade if countries were compensated for any terms-of-trade losses with transfers from countries whose terms-of-trade improve, and if customs unions were required to have no effects on non-member countries. Global free trade with transfers is in...
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A principal must decide whether or not to implement a project which originated with one of her employees. Several employees have information about the quality of the project. A successfully implemented project raises the inventor's chance of promotion, at his peer's expense, but a failed project...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014140793
We conduct an experimental test of the long-standing conjecture that autonomy increases motivation and task performance. Subjects face a menu consisting of two projects: risky and safe. The probability that the risky project succeeds depends on the subject's effort. In one treatment, subjects...
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The implementation problem is the problem of designing a mechanism (game form) such that the equilibrium outcomes satisfy a criterion of social optimality embodied in a social choice rule. If a mechanism has the property that, in each possible state of the world, the set of equilibrium outcomes...
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Stag hunt and chicken games are canonical representations of two kinds of strategic interactions. In stag hunt, aggression feeds on itself, and mutual fear escalates into conflict. Chicken is a model of preemption and deterrence. With complete information, these games have multiple Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003894766
Two decision-makers choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. The decision-making can be manipulated by "extremists" who send publicly observed cheap-talk messages. The power of extremists depends on the nature of the underlying conflict game. If actions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003894773
We build a game-theoretic model where aggression can be triggered by domestic political concerns as well as the fear of being attacked. In the model, leaders of full and limited democracies risk losing power if they do not stand up to threats from abroad. In addition, the leader of a fully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003894777