We analyze horizontal mergers when the acquirer holds a passive partial ownership stake (PPO) in the target firm prior to the merger. We show that a PPO reduces the minimal synergy level necessary to make a merger beneficial for consumers. It follows that an antitrust authority ignoring existing...

Im Rahmen der Sektoruntersuchung des Großhandelsmarktes für Strom hat das Bundeskartellamt 2011 die Auffassung dargelegt, dass marktbeherrschende Unternehmen keine Preisgebote oberhalb der Grenzkosten abgeben dürfen. In dem vorliegenden Beitrag werden die Auswirkungen einer solchen...

The German reserve power market was subject to important regulatory changes in recent years. A new market design was created by synchronization and interconnection of the four control areas. In this paper, we analyze whether or not the reforms led to lower prices for minute reserve power (MRP)....

We analyze the efficiency defense in merger control. First, we show that the relationship between exogenous efficiency gains and social welfare can be non-monotone. Second, we consider both endogenous mergers and endogenous efficiencies and find that merger proposals are largely aligned with a...

This paper argues that it cannot be taken for granted that any merger that raises consumer surplus also increases social welfare. We assume a Cournot model with homogeneous goods, linear demand, and constant marginal costs, to show that a merger can raise consumer surplus while harming social...

Stellungnahme des Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) zum Gesetzentwurf der Landesregierung, Drucksache 16/126, 'Gesetz zur Förderung des Mittelstandes in Nordrhein-Westfalen (Mittelstandsförderungsgesetz)'. Öffentliche Anhörung des Ausschusses für Wirtschaft, Energie,...