This paper analyzes the effects of public information in a perfect competition trading model populated by asymmetrically informed short-horizon investors with different levels of private information precision. We first show that information asymmetry reduces the amount of private information...

This paper analyzes the effects of public information in a perfect competition trading model populated by asymmetrically informed short-horizon investors with different levels of private information precision. We first show that information asymmetry reduces the amount of private information...

We examine how disclosing information about audit quality affects auditors' effort and investors' investment efficiency. In our setting, the usefulness of audited financial reports for investors depends on both the quality of the underlying financial reporting (e.g., as embodied by GAAP) and the...

In this paper, we study a setting where a firm (principal) is privately informed of the firm's potential and contracts with an agent to supply unobservable effort. We show it can be optimal for the firm to have loose monitoring in the sense that the monitoring system is less perfect than what is...