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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507376
This paper discusses liquidity regulation when short-term funding enables credit growth but generates negative systemic risk externalities. It focuses on the relativemerit of price versus quantity rules, showing how they target different incentives for risk creation.When banks differ in credit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383222
We analyze the strategic interaction between undercapitalized banks and a supervisor who may intervene by preventive recapitalization. Supervisory forbearance emerges because political and fiscal costs undermine supervisors' commitment to intervene. When supervisors have lower credibility,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849846
Banks are highly leveraged institutions, potentially attracted to speculative lending even without deposit insurance. A counterbalancing incentive to lend prudently is the risk of loss of charter value, which depends on future rents. We show in a dynamic model that current concentration does not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012715040
We analyze the strategic interaction between undercapitalized banks and a supervisor who may intervene by preventive recapitalization. Supervisory forbearance emerges because political and fiscal costs undermine supervisors' commitment to intervene. When supervisors have lower credibility,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012301221
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012128735
We analyze the strategic interaction between undercapitalized banks and a supervisor who may intervene by preventive recapitalization. Supervisory forbearance emerges because of a commitment problem, reinforced by fiscal costs and constrained capacity. Private incentives to comply are lower when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012007801
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012018840
We analyze the strategic interaction between undercapitalized banks and a supervisor who may intervene by preventive recapitalization. Supervisory forbearance emerges because of a commitment problem, reinforced by fiscal costs and constrained capacity. Private incentives to comply are lower when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315060
We analyze the strategic interaction between undercapitalized banks and a supervisor who may intervene by preventive recapitalization. Supervisory forbearance emerges because political and fiscal costs undermine supervisors' commitment to intervene. When supervisors have lower credibility,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315137