In this paper, we define a modification of the Shapley value for the model of TU games with a priori unions. We provide two characterizations of this value and a new characterization of the Banzhaf–Owen coalitional value. Copyright Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 2014

This paper considers two-stage solutions for multi-issue allocation situations.Characterisations are provided for the two-stage constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules, based on the properties of composition and path independence.

In this paper we define a new family of solutions for the class of cooperative games with transferable utility, in which the set of players exhibits a structure of a priori unions.This family is deeply connected with the Shapley value for games with transferable utility but, moreover, we assume...

In this paper we introduce a property of balanced contributions in the context of multi-issue allocation situations.Using this property, we characterise the run-to-thebank rule for multi-issue allocation situations.