The simple view of joint ventures and venture businesses is that both partners will cooperate to maximize their equity value. In reality, however, there is no guaranty that each partner always behaves to maximize the value of the equity, because partners may have conflicting interests. The...

It has long been said that the Japanese corporate governance does not pay sufficient attention to shareholders as the owners of the corporation. An yet, despite this seeming lack of shareholder ownership, Japanese firms have performed quite well until recently. This paper seeks to solve this...

We argue that the legal boundaries of the firm have more substantial effects on the Japanese multi-business organization than on its U.S. counterpart. The standard economic, management, or legal view is that distinguishing between an in-house division and a subsidiary, in particular, a wholly...

Joint ventures and venture companies present examples of the incomplete contract for economists and the relational contract for legal scholars. Although they have different practical settings, they share the issue of how parties manage the incentive for cooperation. The parties' ultimate goal is...