Game theoretic models of voter turnout have recently fallen into disrepute because the crucial ingredient of the model, the probability of being pivotal for an individual voter, is infinitesimal in large elections. Moreover such models are plagued by the problem of multiple equilibria. We show...

Equilibrium paths in an economy of overlapping generations are determinate. Time is either discrete or continuous; in either case, it extend into the infinite future and, possibly, the infinite past. There is one, nonstorable commodity at each date. The economy is stationary; intertemporal...

A component of Nash equilibria is (dynamically) potentially stable if there exists an evolutionary selection dynamics from a broad class for which the component is asymptotically stable. A necessary condition for potential stability is that the component's index agrees with its Euler...

Two basic properties concerning the dynamic behavior of competitive equilibria of exchange economies with complete markets are derived essentially from the fact that the Walras correspondence has no knots.

We define an algebro-topological concept of essential map and we use it to prove several results in the theory of general equilibrium and nash equilibrium refinement.

Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there is a unique connected and contractible...

Both complete and incomplete game Theoretic Models of Voter Turnout (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983,1985) have the problem of multiple equilibria, some of which seem unreasonable. How can the counter intuitive high turnout equilibria be explained? Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) suggest that the main...

Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there is a unique connected and contractible...