This paper shows a fundamental property of vector fields representing dynamics on spaces of mixed strategies of normal form games whose zeros coincide with the Nash equilibria of the underlying games. The property shown is that the indices of components of zeros of any vector field in this class...

Equilibrium paths in economies of overlapping generations depend on the frequency of trade. In a standard example, determinacy obtains as the frequency of trades tends to infinity or trade occurs in continuous time. If time extends infinitely into the infinite past as well as into the infinite...

A minimal diversity game is an n player strategic form game in which each player has m pure strategies at his disposal. The payoff to each player is always 1, unless all players select the same pure strategy, in which case all players receive zero payoff. Such a game has a unique isolated...

Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there is a unique connected and contractible...