We analyze the influence of unsecured debt (subdebt) on risk-shifting in banks whose assets are risky debt claims. We assume that the stockholders and subdebt-holders jointly decide on risk-shifting. We show that replacing part of the stock with subdebt: (1) leads to fewer risk-shifting events,...

Abstract In many situations a decision maker has incomplete psychological preferences, and the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) is often violated. In this paper we relax WARP, and replace it with another axiom, the convex axiom of revealed non-inferiority (CARNI). An alternative x is...

We define a new solution concept for an undiscounted dynamic game - a perfect uniform normal-form constant-expectation correlated approximate equilibrium with a canonical and universal correlation device. This equilibrium has the following appealing properties: (1) “Trembling-hand”...

We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize's location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium that yields the first-best payoff (i.e.,...

An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the feasible coordinated outcomes....

We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly-optimal strategies given the level of sophistication of their data analytics, and (2) the levels of sophistication form best responses to one another. Under the ensuing equilibrium...

In many situations, such as trade in stock exchanges, agents have many instances to act even though the duration of interactions take a relatively short time. The agents in such situations can often coordinate their actions in advance, but coordination during the game consumes too much time. An...

Simonson and Tversky (Journal of Marketing Research, 1992) demonstrated that the tendency to choose an alternative is enhanced or hindered depending on whether the tradeoffs within the set under consideration are favorable or unfavorable to that option (tradeoff contrast effect). In this paper...

Experimental evidence suggests that people tend to be overconfident in the sense that they overestimate the accuracy of their own predictions. In this paper we present a simple principal-agent model in which principal's interest in dispersing risk motivates him to hire overconfident agents. We...

This paper studies extensive form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves, henceforth called games with public information. On this class, we prove that all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained without mediator by cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated...