implements the full set of stable matchings in the existence of stability, and it ends up with Pareto Optimal matching in the …

In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …

Suppose that the agents of a matching market contact each other randomly and form new pairs if is in their interest …. Does such a process always converge to a stable matching if one exists? If so, how quickly? Are some stable matchings more …. The second part of the paper proposes new techniques to analyse the behaviour of matching markets. We introduce the Stable …

Suppose that the agents of a matching market contact each other randomly and form new pairs if is in their interest …. Does such a process always converge to a stable matching if one exists? If so, how quickly? Are some stable matchings more …. The second part of the paper proposes new techniques to analyse the behaviour of matching markets. We introduce the Stable …

interpretation of these results for matching games. Finally we consider an even more general setting where players' contributions in … in many practical applications, such as NRMP (National Resident Matching Program). …

interpretation of these results for matching games. Finally we consider an even more general setting where players' contributions in … in many practical applications, such as NRMP (National Resident Matching Program). -- Scarf lemma ; core ; stable … matching ; stable allocation ; hospitals residents problem ; couples …

Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed the deferred-acceptance algorithm for matching (i) college applicants and colleges and … always Pareto-optimal: No other matching is at least as good for all the players and better for one or more. If there are …