This paper examines directed networks in which the payoff of a player depends on the total number links formed by her and the other players. After showing that these networks with global spillovers may not always have Nash equilibria in pure strategies, we introduce two additional properties for...

Heterogeneity in Nash networks can arise due to differences in the following four variables: (i) the value of information held by agents, (ii) the rate at which information decays or loses its value as it traverses the network, (iii) the prob- ability with which a links transmits information,...

This paper addresses the existence of Nash networks for the one-way flow model of Bala and Goyal (2000) in a number of different settings. First, we provide conditions for he existence of Nash networks in models where costs and values of links are heterogenous and players obtain resources from...

Heterogeneity in Nash networks with two-way flow can arise due to differences in the follow- ing four variables: (i) the value of information held by players, (ii) the rate at which information decays as it traverses the network, (iii) the probability with which a link transmits information, and...

In this paper, we examine the role played by heterogeneity in the connection model. In sharp contrast to the homogeneous cases we show that under heterogeneity involving only two degrees of freedom, all networks can be supported as Nash or efficient. Moreover, we show that there does not always...

In this note we provide conditions which ensure the existence of Nash networks in One-way flow models with cost heterogeneity.

This paper combines the imperfect reliability model of Bala and Goyal [2000b] with the heterogeneous player model of Galeotti et al. [2006]. We compare existence, characterization and efficiency results in the resulting framework with the results in other frameworks allowing for imperfect...