One explanation provided for the relatively high and increasingly stable spreads for moderate-sized IPOs ($20-$80 million) documented in Chen and Ritter (2000) is that issuing firms focus less on price and more on a combination of investment bank-differentiating factors (such as underwriter...

This paper presents a difference in the comparative statics of general equilibrium models with land when there are finitely many agents, and when there is a continuum of agents. Restricting attention to quasi-linear and Cobb-Douglas utility, it is shown that with finitely many agents, an...

This paper studies comparative statics of equilibria in models where the optimal responses under consideration are (weakly) decreasing in endogenous variables, and (weakly) increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include parameterized games of strategic substitutes. The analysis provides...

This paper uses novel data on the performance of loan pools underlying asset-backed securities to estimate a competing risks model of default and prepayment on subprime automobile loans. We find that prepayment rates increase rapidly with loan age but are not affected by prevailing market...

A test of adverse events and strategic timing theories can be conducted by determining whether some relevant financial decision variables, such as financial benefit from filing for bankruptcy, or debt discharged in bankruptcy are endogenous with the bankruptcy decision or not. For the strategic...

In this paper, I construct a model of an exchange economy in which bankruptcy arises in a manner similar to what we observe. This model is a more realistic representation of some markets in which intertemporal assets are traded. Using standard and natural assumptions, I show that every economy...

Under some conditions, parameterized games with strategic substitutes exhibit monotone comparative statics of equilibria. These conditions relate to a tradeoff between a direct parameter effect and an opposing, indirect strategic substitute effect. If the indirect effect does not dominate the...

In games with strategic substitutes (GSS), convergence of the best response dynamic starting from the inf (or sup) of the strategy space is equivalent to global stability (convergence of every adaptive dynamic to the same pure strategy Nash equilibrium). Consequently, in GSS, global stability...

The order and lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic complements do not survive a minimal introduction of strategic substitutes: in a lattice game in which all-but-one players exhibit strategic complements (with one player exhibiting strict strategic complements), and...