This article examines the potential risks on consumption behavior of lumpsum payments. As a pension, lump-sum payments could be consumed too fast and generate an increase of poverty rates. We experimentally investigate consumption behavior in an inter-temporal decision-making setting. Subjects...

This article examines the potential risks on consumption behavior of lump-sum payments. As a pension, lump-sum payments could be consumed too fast and generate an increase of poverty rates. We experimentally investigate consumption behavior in an inter-temporal decision-making setting. Subjects...

This article examines the potential risks on consumption behavior of lumpsum payments. As a pension, lump-sum payments could be consumed too fast and generate an increase of poverty rates. We experimentally investigate consumption behavior in an inter-temporal decision-making setting. Subjects...

We study whether people's behavior in a one-shot sequential public goods type situation is affected by social information about average behavior by others in the same situation. The kind of social information we consider does not directly affect subjects' payoffs and we are, therefore, able to...

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how, after a history of decay, cooperation in a repeated voluntary contribution game can be revived in an enduring way. Simply starting the repeated game over - a simple fresh start - leads to an initial increase of cooperation, but to a subsequent new...

Competition typically involves two main dimensions, a rivalry for resources and the ranking of relative performances. If socially recognized, the latter yields a ranking in terms of social status. The rivalry of resources resulting from interacting under a competitive incentive scheme has been...

We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments vary with respect to three factors: sequential vs. block or simultaneous entry, the cost functions of entrants and the amount of time during which incumbents are protected from...

The existence of punishment opportunities has been shown to cause efficiency in public goods experiments to increase considerably. In this paper we ask whether punishment also has a downside in terms of process dissatisfaction. We conduct an experiment to study the conjecture that an environment...

We study the effectiveness of leaders for inducing coordinated organizational change to a more efficient equilibrium, i.e., a turnaround. We compare communication from leaders to incentive increases and also compare the effectiveness of randomly selected and elected leaders. While all...