Chapter 1. Introduction -- Part I. Social Choice -- Chapter 2. Building Bridges over the Great Divide -- Chapter 3. Social Unacceptability for Simple Voting Procedures -- Chapter 4. Probability of Majority Inversion with Three States and Interval Preferences -- Chapter 5. Strategic Voting and...

Power indices are mappings that quantify the influence of the members of a voting body on collective decisions a priori. Their nonlinearity and discontinuity makes it difficult to compute inverse images, i.e., to determine a voting system which induces a power distribution as close as possible...

We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players’ informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i’s prediction value equals the difference between the conditional...

Which voting weights ought to be allocated to single delegates of differently sized groups from a democratic fairness perspective? We operationalize the ‘one person, one vote’ principle by demanding every individual’s influence on collective decisions to be equal a priori. The analysis...

For one of the most prominent solution concepts for cooperative TU games, we show that in the weighted case the nucleolus tends to the weights as the number of players increases under very mild conditions. We give a sufficient characterization for the case of coincidence between weights and...

The new voting system of the Council of the European Union cannot be represented as the intersection of six or fewer weighted games, i.e., its dimension is at least 7. This sets a new record for real-world voting bodies. A heuristic combination of different discrete optimization methods yields a...