The authors modify the price-setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (Effect of Credible Quality Investment with Bertrand and Cournot Competition, 2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage....

We examine the relationship between competition and innovation in an industry where production is polluting and R&D aims to reduce emissions ("green" innovation). We present an n-firm oligopoly where firms compete in quantities and decide their investment in "green" R&D. When environmental...

type="main" xml:lang="en" <title type="main">Abstract</title> <p>Contrary to theoretical predictions, empirical evidence shows that an increase in trade liberalization causes an increase in foreign direct investment. We propose an explanation for this apparent puzzle by exploiting Dastidar's approach, which delivers a...</p>

We investigate a linear state differential game describing an asymmetric Cournot duo- poly with capacity accumulation à la Ramsey and a negative environmental externality (pollution), in which one of the firms has adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) in its statute, and therefore...

In this paper we analyse a setup where consumers are heterogeneous in the perception of environmental quality. The equilibrium is verified in a setting with horizontal and vertical (green) differentiation. Profits are increasing in the misper- ception of quality, while, the investment in green...

In this paper we analyse a setup where consumers are heterogeneous in the perception of environmental quality. The equilibrium is verified in a setting with horizontal and vertical (green) differentiation. Profits are increasing in the mis- perception of quality, while the investment in green...

We modify the vertically differentiated duopoly model by André et al. (2009) replacing Bertrand with Cournot behaviour, and we characterise the region wherein a Porter-type result takes place. We show that the Porter hypothesis applies in an equilibrium taking always the form of a prisoner's...

The authors modify the price-setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (Effect of Credible Quality Investment with Bertrand and Cournot Competition, 2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage....

We investigate the introduction of a minimum quality standard in a vertically differentiated duopoly where production is polluting. We examine the alternative frameworks with quality-dependent fixed or variable costs, under both price and quantity competition. Under Bertrand behaviour, the...

This paper investigates how CSR firms influence a Cournot oligopoly with pollution. We define as CSR a firm that takes into account not only its profits but also internalises its own share of the externality and is sensitive to consumer surplus. The CSR firm obtains higher profits compared to...