We generalize the N-person evolutionary snowdrift game to incorporate the effects of costly punishment in a well-mixed population. A set of dynamical equations that account for the evolution of the frequencies of the three strategies under replicator dynamics is formulated. At long time, the...

The role of punishments in promoting cooperation is an important issue. We incorporate costly punishments into the snowdrift game (SG) by introducing a third punishing (P) character, and study the effects. The punishers, who carry basically a cooperative (C) character, are willing to pay a cost...

The N-person evolutionary snowdrift game (NESG) is generalized to study the effects of the additional benefit to all agents in a competing group of size N resulting from an earlier completion of a task when more agents are willing to share the work. Following replicator dynamics, an equation...

We study the time evolution of cooperation in a recently proposed N-person evolutionary snowdrift game, by focusing on the details of the evolutionary dynamics. It is found that the analytic solution for the equilibrium fraction of cooperators as given previously by the replicator dynamics stems...

Cooperation in the N-person evolutionary snowdrift game (NESG) is studied in scale-free Barabási–Albert (BA) networks. Due to the inhomogeneity of the network, two versions of NESG are proposed and studied. In a model where the size of the competing group varies from agent to agent, the...

The effects of an additional strategy or character in the evolutionary snowdrift game (SG) are studied in a well-mixed population or fully connected network and in a square lattice. The SG, which is a possible alternative to the prisoner's dilemma game in studying cooperative phenomena in...

Epidemiological processes are studied within a recently proposed hierarchical network model using the susceptible–infected–refractory dynamics of an epidemic. Within the network model, a population may be characterized by H independent hierarchies or dimensions, each of which consists of...

We study the competition and strategy selections between a class of generalized zero-determinant (ZD) strategies and the classic strategies of always cooperate (AllC), always defect (AllD), tit-for-tat (TFT), and win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) strategies in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma...

An evolutionary snowdrift game (SG) that incorporates bounded rationality and limited information in the evolutionary process is proposed and studied. Based on SG in a well-mixed population and defining the winning action at a turn to be the one that gets a higher payoff, the most recent m...

The separatrices between the healthy and endemic states in the bistable regime and issues related to determining the critical infected fraction i(crit) in a recently proposed epidemic model on an adaptive network are analyzed. The epidemic follows the susceptible–infected–susceptible (SIS)...