We examine how the banking sector may ignite the formation of assetprice bubbles when there is access to abundant liquidity. Inside banks,given lack of observability of effort, loan officers (or risk takers)are compensated based on the volume of loans but are penalized if bankssuffer a high...

We develop a model of financial intermediation wherein bank managers "reach for yield" - by overinvesting in risky assets and underinvesting in safer assets - provided they do not face much cost from liquidity shortfalls. The managers follow a pecking order in which their first preference is to...

We examine how the banking sector could ignite the formation of asset price bubbles when there is access to abundant liquidity. Inside banks, to induce effort, loan officers are compensated based on the volume of loans. Volume-based compensation also induces greater risk taking; however, due to...

We examine how the banking sector may ignite the formation of asset price bubbles when there is access to abundant liquidity. Inside banks, given lack of observability of effort, loan officers (or risk takers) are compensated based on the volume of loans but are penalized if banks suffer a high...

This article develops a model that studies how the presence of a lender of last resort (LOLR) affects the ex ante investment incentives of banks. We show that a perfectly informed LOLR induces a first-best outcome for small and medium sized banks but causes moral hazard in larger banks given the...