All agents have the same ordinal ranking over all objects, receiving no object (opting out) may be preferable to some objects, agents differ on which objects are worse than opting out, and the latter information is private. The Probabilistic Serial assignment, improves upon (in the Pareto sense)...

We consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is preferred to remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate; all acceptable mates are welfare-wise identical. Using...

We study the problem of locating multiple public facilities when each member of society has to be assigned to exactly one of these facilities. Individuals' preferences are assumed to be single-peaked over the interval of possible locations and negatively affected by congestion. We characterize...

Several authors recently proposed an elegant construction to divide the minimal cost of connecting a given set of users to a source. This folk solution applies the Shapley value to the largest reduction of the cost matrix that does not affect the efficient cost. It is also obtained by the linear...

This paper examines a model of multijurisdiction formation where individuals' characteristics are uniformly distributed over a finite interval. Every jurisdiction locates a public facility and distributes its cost equally among the residents. We consider the notions of Nash and local Nash...