Showing 161 - 170 of 2,629
We explore the trade-off between a patent's length (its lifetime) and its width (its scope of coverage). A wider patent generally reduces the distortion of consumers' choices between the patented brand of the product and unpatented, lower-priced varieties sold by competitors, it also permits...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656411
This paper reviews the part played by economists in organizing the British third-generation mobile-phone licence auction that concluded on 27 April 2000. It raised £22½ billion ($34 billion or 2½ % of GNP) and was widely described at the time as the biggest auction ever. We discuss the merits...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661794
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European ‘third generation’ (3G, or ‘MTS’) mobile-phone license auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the UK, though the values of the licences sold were similar. Poor auction designs in some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662052
This paper provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer [ed.], Edward Elgar [pub.],...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662705
Most markets clear through a sequence of sales rather than through a Walrasian auctioneer. Because buyers can decide whether to buy now or later, rather than only now or never, their current `willingness to pay' is much more sensitive to price than is the demand curve. In consequence, markets...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666538
This paper provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.),...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666747
Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: a public auction or an optimally structured negotiation with a smaller number of bidders? We show that under standard assumptions the public auction is always preferable, even if it forfeits all the seller's negotiating power, including the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666938
The author suggests a new model of demand for variety that explains why competing firms may choose very similar product lines: if firms offer different product ranges, some consumers use multiple suppliers to increase variety and, since these consumers' purchases will be sensitive to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005573089
Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder? The authors show, under reasonable assumptions, that the auction is always preferable when bidders' signals are independent. For affiliated signals,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005573856
We generalize the War of Attrition model to allow for N + K firms competing for N prizes. Two special cases are of particular interest. First, if firms continue to pay their full costs after dropping out (as in a standard-setting context), each firm's exit time is independent both of K and of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005580599