We study a variant of a random utility model that takes a probability distribution over preference relations as its primitive. We do not model products using a space of observed characteristics. The distribution of preferences is only partially identified using cross-sectional data on varying...

This paper studies shill bidding in the VCG mechanism applied to combinatorial auctions. Shill bidding is a strategy whereby a single decision-maker enters the auction under the guise of multiple identities (Sakurai, Yokoo, and Matsubara 1999). I formulate the problem of optimal shill bidding...

This paper studies optimal persuasion. A speaker must decide which arguments to present and a listener which arguments to accept. Communication is limited in that the arguments available to the speaker depend on her information. Optimality is assessed from the listener's perspective assuming...

We study identification of combinatorial valuations from aggregate demand. Each utility function takes as arguments subsets or, alternatively, quantities of the multiple goods. We exploit mathematical insights from auction theory to generically identify the distribution of utility functions. In...

We study a variant of a random utility model that takes a probability distribution over preference relations as its primitive. We do not model products using a space of observed characteristics. The distribution of preferences is only partially identified using cross-sectional data on varying...